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This paper introduces four versions of an international bilateral migration stock database 
for 226 by 226 countries and territories. The first three versions each consist of two 
matrices, the first containing migrants defined by country of birth, i.e. the foreign-born 
population, the second, by nationality, i.e. the foreign population. Wherever possible, the 
information is collected from the 2000 round of censuses, though older data are included 
where this information was unavailable. The first version of the matrices contains as 
much data as could be collated at the time of writing but also contains gaps. The later 
versions progressively employ a variety of techniques to estimate the missing data. The 
final matrix, comprising only the foreign-born, attempts to reconcile all of the available 
information to provide the researcher with a single and complete matrix of international 
bilateral migrant stocks. The final section of the paper describes some of the patterns 
evident in the database. 
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Economists have become increasingly cognizant of the importance of international 
migration over the last few years. In developed countries there has been intense debate 
about appropriate immigration policies (e.g Borjas, 2003), while among development 
economists interest has focused on the links between migration and development (e.g. 
Lucas, 2005, Ozden and Schiff, 2005). Topics include the determinants of migration (e.g. 
Hatton and Williamson, 2002), the role of migration and remittances in poverty alleviation 
(Ozden and Schiff, 2005, Part I), migration and human development (e.g. McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2005, McKenzie and Hildebrandt, 2005), the brain drain (Stark, 2003, 
Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2004, Docquier and Marfouk, 2005), South-
South migration (e.g. Ratha, 2006) and the links between migration, trade and 
investment (Rauch, 2001). At a global level, research has explored the benefits from 
possible agreements to foster South-North migration (Walmsley and Winters, 2005, 
Pritchett, 2006).   
 
Given this increasing interest in migration, it might seem surprising that few attempts 
have been made to take a global view of the patterns of international migration between 
countries and regions. This deficiency essentially reflects the lack of comprehensive and 
reliable data on bilateral flows of migration. OECD produces detailed stock and flow data 
on immigrants in OECD and a few other countries (e.g. OECD, 2002), early versions of  
which have been used for analysis – e.g Mayda (2006). The United Nations adopts a 
global perspective when summarizing international migrant movements, but its work 
provides only total migrant stocks for each country. National data sources frequently 
allow some geographical disaggregation, but attempts to combine them into a broader 
framework exhibit a number of common failings: for example, data availability only for a 
particular region and serious challenges of comparability from one country to another. 
Among the latter is the problem of how to define migrants by place of origin. This can 
most readily be done either by country of birth or by country of citizenship, but where 
attempts have been made, typically no distinction is drawn between the two concepts 
despite the large disparities that exist between them.  
 
This paper makes a start toward rectifying these shortcomings of the data by introducing 
four versions of two origin-destination matrices for 226 countries and territories using the 
data from the 2000 round of censuses.
1 The first of these matrices records foreign 
population by country of birth and the second the population by nationality, which, for the 
purposes of the paper, is treated as analogous to citizenship.
2 Though countries employ 
many different methods for collecting and presenting these data, we attempt to reconcile 
these methods to create as full and comparable a dataset as possible. The four versions 
reflect different points on the trade-off between the comprehensiveness of coverage and 
the use of assumption and interpolation to compensate for missing data. We report all 
four because the different versions will be appropriate for different uses, and we discuss 
                                                 
1 For reasons of space, the matrices cannot be reproduced in this paper. The first two versions are available 
on the website of the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty at 
www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html The other two 
versions are available to researchers by request to the same centre or Version 4c only, aggregated to a 
87x87 matrix, is available at: www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/labor_migration.asp  
2 United Nations (1980) defines a person’s citizenship as their legal nationality. Following from this, no 
distinction is made here between citizenship and nationality, and thus no notion of belonging or of political or 
legal participation is employed.   4
them in as transparent a fashion as possible so that readers may choose the version 
which best suits their needs.  
 
The first version simply contains the raw data with some minor adjustments and will be 
of more use to a demographer. The later versions contain more bilateral entries, and 
despite the fact that individual entries are less accurate (some, indeed being pretty crude 
approximations), they may well prove more useful to the applied economist. The final 
version (version 4), though covering only the foreign-born, represents as full a picture of 
bilateral international migrant flows as data permit. By introducing the data in this way, it 
is hoped that this paper will provide a pathway into a rich resource for further research.
3 
 
The data in the four matrices are generated by the stock of migrants at destination 
country and territory disaggregated by country and territory of origin around the year 
2000. They make no reference to the time at which a migration has taken place, but 
provide only an estimate of the cumulative migrations to date into an area (net of re-
emigrations). At present, no global source exists for flow data in which immigration (or 
emigration) can be related to specific periods of time, for example, movements over the 
previous 1 year or 5 years. Flow data of this type are only available for a relatively few, 
generally more developed, countries. In a way, international migration statistics are not 
far from where data on internal migration were some 40 years ago. 
 
The paper concludes with a brief description of the patterns that are revealed by this 
new data source. The most important finding is that patterns do indeed differ 
substantially across migration corridors. For example, immigration in the United States is 
dominated by Latin America, whereas Western European immigration draws heavily on 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region. Over one-third of world 
migration is from developing to developed countries, with only about a quarter between 
developing countries. Intra-developed country and intra-FSU (former Soviet Union) flows 
each account for about 15 percent of the total. Over half of migration is between 
countries with linguistic ties. Africa accounts for 8 percent of Western Europe’s 
immigration and much less of that in other rich regions.  
 
The remainder of the paper comprises the following. Section 2 describes who qualifies 
as a migrant under both of the definitions utilized in this paper. Section 3 investigates the 
sources of migration statistics and their interpretation; it makes clear the heterogeneity 
that exists among the available statistics and the challenges entailed in making them 
comparable.
4 Section 4 outlines the different versions of the matrices and the final 
section provides some summary statistics of the patterns observed. 
 
2.  Who Counts as a Migrant? 
 
Definitions of a “migrant” are various. International migrants may be recorded in terms 
of: 
•  country of birth 
•  country of citizenship  
•  last country of previous residence  
                                                 
3 The database has undergone several rounds of improvement and extension. The first public version was 
described in Parsons et al (2005) and an intermediate version was used and briefly described in Ratha 
(2006). 
4 Our treatment is far from comprehensive. See Bilsborrow et al (1997).   5
•  duration of time spent away from birthplace or last place of previous residence
5 
•  purpose of their stay (visa type) 
 
The above classification comes from Bilsborrow et al (1997), who also discuss other 
possible definitions such as those based on ethnicity. The United Nations (1998) defines 
a migrant as "any person who changes his or her country of usual residence", though 
residence may refer to a change both of residence or of residential status. Tourists and 
business travellers, among others, are therefore not included in the international 
migration statistics, as their movements do not involve changing their usual place of 
residence. Tourists are often recorded in separate statistics and business visitors are 
often not recorded among the migrant population.  
 
Statistically, the migrant population can be equated directly with the number of 
foreigners: either those recorded by country of birth, the foreign-born, or that fraction of 
the population with foreign nationality, the foreign population. The confusion over 
migrants is exacerbated, however, by the fact that a migrant’s nationality need not be the 
same as their country of birth. Nationality can be changed; birthplace cannot (not legally, 
at any rate). Thus, one may be born locally but qualify as a foreign national if born to 
foreign parents, or conversely, one can be born a national but still be characterized as 
foreign-born if born overseas. Table 1 summarizes the various possibilities of what 
constitutes the foreign population under each definition, taking the examples of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom. Only domestic nationals residing in their home country of birth 
do not qualify as immigrants under one or other of the definitions. A third possibility is 
that one can adopt the nationality of one’s country of residence after some time via 
naturalization procedures.  
 
Given the variety of nationality criteria and the differences between countries in their 
willingness to naturalize immigrants, we find the foreign-born criterion more useful for 
economic analysis, and in our final version of the data, we make use of nationality 
statistics only where foreign birth data are unavailable. It is also the case that the former 
corresponds more closely to the notion of international movement: defined by country of 




                                                 
5 Though it is increasingly recognized that distinguishing between shorter and longer term migrants is useful 
for policy making etc. this division is ignored here since censuses generally fail to make this distinction. 
Indeed, countries seldom accurately distinguish these alternative series. 
6 The caveat is that sometimes country borders are moved, creating apparent migrants out of static 
households.   6
Table 1. Who qualifies as a migrant? 
 
UK born  UK born  Irish born  Irish born   
UK nationality  Irish nationality  UK nationality  Irish nationality 
Not foreign 
population by 
country of birth 
Foreign 
population in UK 
by country of 
birth 
Foreign 
population in UK 
by country of 
birth   
Residing in UK 
DOES NOT 
QUALIFY AS 
MIGRANT  Foreign 
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One problem arising from these definitional issues is encountered when dealing with 
former colonies. For example, many Portuguese nationals are born abroad in one of 
Portugal’s former colonies. As outlined in table 2, the Portuguese census reports nearly 
50,000 people born in Brazil, but only 32,000 with Brazilian nationality. Care should 
therefore be exercised since a large proportion of foreign-born migrants will have a 
domestic nationality. 
 





colony defined as 
foreign-born 
Migrants from 
colony defined as 
foreign citizens 
Migrants born in the 
colony but with 
Portuguese nationality 
Brazil 49,891 31,869 18,022
Mozambique 76,017 4,685 71,332
Angola 174,210 37,014 137,196
Cape Verde  44,964 33,145 11,819
Guinea-Bissau 21,435 15,824 5,611
Sao Tome and 
Principe  12,490 8,517 3,973
Macau 2,882 71 2,811
Timor Leste  2,241 137 2,104
Total   384,130 131,262 252,868
 
 
3.  About the Data 
 
Sources of Migrant Stock Data  
 
Immigrant stocks
7 are usually recorded by demographic methods that measure the total 
population, and the most important of these are the population censuses. The census, a 
                                                 
7 This paper omits detailed discussion of immigrant flows. Readers are referred to OECD 2002a and b and 
2003.   7
retrospective system for surveying the entire population at a single point in time, is 
generally considered the most comprehensive record of the total population. Perhaps 
the greatest strength of census data for measuring migrant populations, besides their 
universal coverage, is the limited scope of the questions asked, which facilitates 
comparability across countries. However, censuses are infrequent and although virtually 
every country in the world conducts censuses, invariably they are carried out on different 
dates within census "rounds" that usually span a decade. The latest, 2000, round of 
censuses that included nearly all countries




Two definitions of the total (resident) population are commonly applied in censuses: de 
facto and de jure. The de facto population refers to all persons physically present in a 
country at the census moment. The de jure population refers to all those persons who 
either are usually resident, or who qualify as legally resident, at the census moment. 
They are often defined as those who have been resident in that country for a particular 
length of time, which can range from between 3 months to 1 year. Traditionally, 
censuses define migrants either as the foreign-born, or as the foreign population, 
although in recent years a growing recognition of the value of obtaining both sets of data 
has emerged. 
 
An alternative source for calculating migrant stocks is the population register, although 
these are more often used to measure flows. Population registers are continuous 
reporting systems for recording births, deaths and changes of residence in a population 
and so offer data quite different from those in censuses. However, few countries 
maintain population registers and those that do rarely offer a comprehensive view of 
either country of birth or nationality. Data from registers are employed in this study only 
where appropriate census data were unavailable.  
 
Of course, in an ideal world, we would like to have flow as well as stock data on 
migration. These can be inferred from census data through the inclusion of questions 
asking where people used to live in the past. Unfortunately, these data are not available 
for enough countries to give a broad coverage of origin and destination flows for specific 
time periods. A second potential source of flow data is immigration records, which 
provide a continuous register of all legal migrants into a country within specific periods of 
time and are usually published annually. Again, however, the coverage of such records 
is patchy and the information collected and processed highly variable, so that in the end 
they are not a basis for a global dataset. Even developed countries rarely maintain a 
record of those leaving, irrespective of whether they are natives or foreigners. Looking to 
a utopian future, immigration and emigration records could provide an ideal source for 
the study of international migration, especially if they are linked to migrants’ domestic 
records, as is increasingly called for by security services, but there is still a long way to 
go! 
 
                                                 
8 Those not taking part include: Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru, North Korea, Myanmar, Bhutan, Taiwan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Western Sahara, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Togo, 
Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Angola, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Madagascar. (Source: United Nations, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census). 
9 It must be emphasized that, although the vast majority of countries conducted censuses during this round, 
many have still to process and publish the data.   8
The Comparability of Migration Statistics 
 
Compilation of comparable data across countries is hampered by the many disparities in 
collection practices. These include surveying on different dates, omitting different 
categories of people,
10 defining migration differently, a lack of standardization between 
the questions asked during the census, and alternative country coding used to record 
the responses.
11 The United Nations (1980) recommends that migrants should be 
enumerated according to the borders in existence at the time of census or survey. Over 
time, however, borders are redefined, and new countries are created; those interviewed 
may simply be unaware of boundary changes and misclassify their country of birth. 
Indeed a foreign-born migrant, resident for many years, may classify themselves as 
native even when they should in fact be otherwise classified, thus biasing results. In 
other instances, the non-response level of migrants may be very significant as census 
takers are often poorly trained and many mistakes will go undetected. During the 1969 
Kenyan census, for example 78,756 individuals did not respond to the place of birth 
question, a high figure relative to the 158,692 that stated they were foreign-born 
(Bilsborrow et al 1997).  
 
The problem of measuring illegal immigration is also considerable and the omission of 
illegal immigrants will distort official migration figures. The extent to which census data 
record them will vary across countries, not least with the likelihood that census returns 
could be used to detect and apprehend people without proper authorization. A pertinent 
example is Russia, a "migration magnet" in recent years and the country with the longest 
border, with approximately 450 official border posts. Feasible calculations estimating the 
number of illegal migrants residing in the Russian Federation range from 3.5 to 6 million 
persons (Heleniak 2002), though there is no real way of ever accurately knowing. In the 
United States, which arguably conducts the most comprehensive census, the best 
estimate of the number of unauthorized persons is calculated using a residual method, 
i.e. subtracting known authorized persons away from the total number of foreign-born 
(Passel 2005). Numerous migrants are therefore likely to remain unrecorded, not least 
because it is not in their interest for the authorities to know that they are residing illegally. 
In some cases, it is also not in the political interests of the authorities to know or 
recognize the extent of the problem of illegal entrants.  
 
The rate of naturalization also negatively impinges on the quality of migration statistics. 
This varies significantly among countries, and differences in a country's propensity to 
offer citizenship impacts potentially very seriously on migration statistics recorded by 
nationality. Naturalizations in South-East and Eastern Asia, for example, are rare; so 
much so, in fact, that in many cases foreign nationality data can be directly equated to 
the foreign-born. In these countries, first-generation migrants and additionally immigrant 
births contribute almost solely to the foreign population. Indeed, in the specific case of 
Japan, migrants of even older generations still need to apply for citizenship, a lengthy 
and arduous process. Owing to increased marriages between Japanese and foreigners, 
the number of naturalizations has increased steadily, though the figure is still 
comparatively very low. Conversely, in countries such as Belgium, where naturalizations 
are far more common, additional migrants and immigrant births probably contribute 
                                                 
10The United Nations notes, for example, that developed countries generally include refugees in their 
censuses whilst these are largely omitted from censuses in developing countries.  
11 For example, the number of Puerto Ricans in the United States will not be recorded since they count as 
Americans. 
   9
significantly to the domestic population as foreign citizens become naturalized. For our 
purposes, the disparity between two immigration systems will impact on the proportion of 
the foreign relative to the national population.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the way in which immigration statistics are measured has 
caused several discontinuities in the data, such as that resulting from the break-up of the 
FSU, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. All of these events produced millions of additional 
international migrants overnight as new boundaries were drawn and new nationalities 
created. The data have been adjusted accordingly to include these new migrants. On the 
other hand, the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 did not reduce the 
number of migrants: the Chinese are still regarded as “migrants” and contribute over 2 
million (1 percent) to the United Nations total.  
 
The Data Collected  
 
Fully aware of the challenges of data compilation, we now describe the new dataset. The 
aim of this study was to include as many of the world's migrants as possible, to assign 
them  all to specific countries of origin with the highest degree of accuracy and to 
produce as full and comparable a bilateral database of international migration stocks as 
is possible. In its final form, the data should be easy to interpret, suitable for a wide 
range of academic purposes and easy to update should further material become 
available. In most cases, data were recorded from their original source. Data from the 
latest census round were preferred, as these were considered most comparable at the 
global level, although given the significant lags that often exist between the timing of 
censuses and their publication "latest" was not always very recent. Data on both foreign-
born and foreign nationals were compiled where feasible. Population registers were then 
drawn upon where censuses were unavailable for the 2000 round of censuses.
12 In 
some cases where neither source was available, data were obtained from reliable 
secondary sources that cite the original.
13 Some regions of the world provide significantly 
better data than others, and some simply do not exist in the public domain or even at all. 
While the data for Europe, the Americas and much of Oceania are of a fair standard, the 
data for parts of Asia and much of Africa are of more dubious quality. Annex 1 provides 
a summary of the raw data collected, showing whether the data are bilateral and the 
corresponding sources and years.  
 
4.  The Versions of the Data Matrix 
 
As noted above, four versions of the data are discussed, each progressively more 
complete but more speculative than the last. Each of the first three versions of the 
database contains two matrices covering both emigration and immigration for each of 
226 countries or territories,
14 one recording the foreign-born, the other the foreign 
                                                 
12 In such cases, since the majority of censuses refer to the years 2000 and 2001 these years were 
prioritized; and where data were available for both 2000 and 2001, data for 2001 were preferred since it is 
more recent. 
13 These include the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Migration Policy 
Institute, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Department for International 
Development, the International Labour Organization, and the United Nations, together with various national 
statistics bureaux. 
14 In addition to the 226x226 matrices, data aggregated into the 87 GTAP regions corresponding to the 
GTAP database version 6, may be obtained from the authors. This aggregation will likely smooth over some 
of the inaccuracies contained in later versions.   10
nationals. The fourth version covers only the foreign-born. Version 1 contains all the raw 
data collected with a few adjustments. In the sources drawn upon in this paper it is 
common for migrants that cannot be assigned to a specific country of birth/nationality to 
be recorded in remainder categories that typically have the prefix "Other". In version 1, 
there is no attempt to reassign these migrants and the "Other" category, which often 
contributes significantly to the overall total, is simply reported below the matrix in the 
relevant (host nation) column. In a few cases, large "unknown" categories were recorded 
in the original data, for example the German data collected from the OECD. These 
"unknowns" were completely removed from the matrices since it is unclear whether they 
actually refer to migrants, and will often contain members of the domestic population, 
since domestic populations are normally far larger than foreign populations. Where 
countries used country coding referring to the USSR, Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, and 
where bilateral information on migrants’ destination post break-up was available, these 
aggregated totals were distributed on the same basis, implicitly assuming therefore that 
migration proportions were the same after break-up.
15 Zeros were entered where it could 
be inferred from the data that no migrants were assigned to a specific country. 
Dependencies and re-coded countries were also aggregated up into one of the 226 
countries and territories included in the database.   
 
In version 2 of the matrices, composite or regional origins for which no country-specific 
migration data were available (including break-up countries) are disaggregated 
according to their shares in total population.
16 Though a rudimentary method of 
estimation, as migrants are more likely to come from countries in close proximity at the 
regional level (Harrison, Britton and Swanson 2003), this method was deemed a 
reasonable exercise. As an example, the 1996 New Caledonia census recorded one 
category as "Melanesia", which included 86,788 unassigned migrants from Fiji, Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Vanuatu was not included under "Melanesia" as 
it constituted a separate category in the census. Table 3 demonstrates how these 
migrants for New Caledonia were distributed across these countries in direct proportion 




Table 3. New Caledonia migrant split based on population shares for Melanesia 
 





Fiji 786,603  13.5  11,710 
Solomon Islands  410,641  7.0  6,113 
PNG 4,456,781  76.4  66,346 




                                                 
15 Both of these assumptions are open to challenge but, given the data availability, it is difficult to think of 
better alternatives than just making them and owning up.  
16 These were, by and large, small remainder categories that overlapped with larger "other" categories, those 
disaggregated in versions 4a-4c. 
17 Jointly reported countries, those recorded by name, for example "Botswana and Swaziland" are omitted 
from table 5.    11
Table 4. Population splits 
 
Region/Country Group  Split into: 
USSR  Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
Yugoslavia  Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and 
Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. 
CSFR  Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Dominicans  Dominica and Dominican Republic 
Other United States island areas and Puerto Rico  Guam, Marshall Islands, Northern Marianas, Federated States of Micronesia, 
American Samoa, US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico 
Korea  North and South Korea 
South Asia  India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan 
Middle Eastern countries  Turkey, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestinian 
Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen, Cyprus 
West Indies  Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, British Virgin Islands,  Dominica, 
Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat St Vincent 
and the Grenadines,  St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago and US 
Virgin Islands 
Polynesia  American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, 
Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna Islands 
Melanesia  Fiji, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and PNG 
South East Asian countries  Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam 
UK dependent territories  Anguilla, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, St Helena, Montserrat, Pitcairn 
Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands 
Commonwealth Caribbean  Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, St Lucia, Grenada, Barbados, 
Antigua and Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis, Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bahamas 
French Equatorial Africa  Chad, Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic 
Micronesia  Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Northern Marianas, Guam, Marshall 
Islands, Palau, Nauru 
Other Western Asia  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordon, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Palestine, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates and Yemen 
Southern Africa  South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, and Swaziland. 
Arab gulf co-op council  Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates 
Other Arab  Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. 
Trust Territory of the Pacific  Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, Northern Marianas,  
Overseas French Territories  French Polynesia, Mayotte, New Caledonia, St Pierre et Miquelon, Wallis and 
Futuna 
Leeward Islands  British Virigin Islands, Anguilla, Guadeloupe, Netherlands Antilles, Antigua, 
Barbuda, St Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, Guadeloupe, Dominica  
Windward Islands  Barbados, Grenada, Martinique, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Trinidad and Tobago 
French West Indies  Martinique, Guadeloupe 
US Indies  Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands 
Borneo  Indonesia (Kalimantan), Malaysia (Sabah, Sarawak), Brunei 
English Caribbean  Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,  Barbados, British Virgin Islands,  
Cayman Islands, Dominica, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines , St Lucia, St Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago  
Nordic Countries/Scandinavia  Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland 
Indian Ocean  Reunion, Mayotte, Madagascar 
 
 
Version 3 removes nationality headings which use ethnic background to distinguish 
migrants, for example "Crimean Tatars". These categories proved difficult to assign 
geographically and were removed entirely from the dataset, and their numbers 
subtracted from the country totals. These had previously been included to facilitate 
research on ethnicity. Other headings referring to totals largely incorporating nationals 
were likewise removed. This included those persons who possessed dual nationality and 
ambiguous "ignored" totals. Additionally, Srivastava and Sasikumar (2005) was drawn 
upon to supplement the database with information on the estimated number of migrants 
from India abroad in the Middle East.  
 
Version 4, though the fullest, is arguably the least accurate set of data. This version 
supplements the foreign-born matrix with shares across sending countries derived from 
the nationality matrix, augments the foreign-born matrix with the United Nations (2004) 
totals for 2000 where no other data were available, and reconciles all of the remainder 
categories. Finally, it scales all the data predating 2000 to the United Nations (2004) 
total for that year. As each of these steps represents a large adjustment, version 4 is   12
split into three sub-components (versions 4a-4c). The decision to produce the final 
matrix utilizing the foreign-born definition was based on the fact that a greater number of 
countries report data by place of birth, that this definition is less vulnerable to differences 
in naturalization policies across countries and that it more readily accords to the actual 
movement of migrants, which is the economist’s principal interest. These three iterations 




The 2003 United Nations data set (United Nations 2004), covering migrant stocks for the 
year 2000, is generally considered the most comparable source on international migrant 
stocks, despite the fact that some of the data were extrapolated from older sources. 
Indeed, it is still held in high esteem even though, where no foreign-born data are 
available, numbers are interpolated from data based on nationality and ethnicity 
concepts. Where no other data were available it was deemed sensible to use the United 
Nations data for country totals and our data are essentially calibrated to the United 
Nations totals. 
 
A high degree of correlation has previously been understood to exist between the 
foreign-born and foreign-nationality populations (Harrison, Britton and Swanson 2003). If 
this is indeed the case, then it would be feasible to use information from the nationality 
matrix to supplement that of the foreign-born. First, it was important to check that this 
association existed in relation to the data collected. For those 35 countries where data 
were available for both the foreign-born and the foreign population for comparable years, 
a technique based on the entropy measure devised by Walmsley and McDougal (2004) 
was used (Annex 2).  
 
This methodology calculates the differences in the shares between the foreign-born 
matrix and the nationality matrix as the equally weighted average of the simple share 
from a particular coefficient in the foreign-born matrix multiplied by the natural log of the 
ratio of that share, to the equivalent share in the nationality matrix. The two major 
advantages of this technique are first that it is possible to compare shares between two 
tables whilst ignoring any zero entries; and second, that the differences between two 
large shares are given less weight than the same absolute difference in two relatively 
smaller shares. 
 
On average, the entropy difference between shares for the 35 countries for which data 
were available for both the foreign-born and the foreign nationality was negligible. 
Having found that the series were indeed highly correlated, the shares from the 
nationality matrix were multiplied by the United Nations totals in the foreign-born matrix 
for those countries where no bilateral information was available. South-East and East 
Asian countries
18 with detailed bilateral data were not subjected to this treatment as 
naturalizations are so rare that it is fair to assume that these data may be directly 
equated to the foreign-born population. We calculated the magnitude of the margin of 
error of treating foreign nationals as equivalent to the foreign-born to be approximately 
1.22 percent for Japan, and 0.15 for South Korea.
19 The foreign-born coefficients for 
those 75 countries until now lacking any bilateral foreign-born information were therefore 
filled. 
                                                 
18 Namely Japan, Korea, Macau, the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar. 




Residual categories, labelled with the prefix "Other", are common in the reported data 
(e.g. "Other Caribbean"). As the study aims to assign every migrant to a specific country, 
systematically these migrants, who numbered approximately 11.9 million and 9.6 million 
respectively under the two definitions of foreign-born and nationality, were distributed 
across the countries within the "other" region. This was done according to each country’s 









M P  
 
Where:   Pr/other  = Country r’s propensity to send nationals abroad relative to the other countries located in 
the "other" region.  
Mr  = The number of migrants abroad from country r. 
Ms = The number of migrants abroad from countries s in the other region. 
 
These propensities are shares, so they sum to one. The remainder categories were 
therefore disaggregated by multiplying the propensity shares for those countries 
contained within an umbrella remainder heading by the total number of migrants to be 
redistributed. This process relies on a specific ordering, and a strict ordering was 
adhered to, in which, for each successive allocation, the largest number of migrants was 
used to recalculate the propensity shares. Therefore the smaller, regional remainder 
categories (e.g. "Other Caribbean") were disaggregated prior to the larger categories (for 
example "Other"). As most of the remainder headings refer to continental groupings, 
users who choose to aggregate the data by continent would avoid most of the 
approximation introduced here. 
 
An illustrative case is that of Portugal. All migrants in the 2001 Portuguese census had 
been designated to specific countries with the exception of 6 migrants in the heading 
"Other Oceania". These remaining 6 migrants had to be shared out between the 
countries of Oceania. Applying the equation above, the propensity to send migrants 
anywhere abroad was calculated for each of these countries. Table 5 contains these 
propensity shares and shows how many immigrants were distributed based on these 
numbers for each country. This was assumed to be the most pragmatic method for 
distributing the remainder categories, though two weaknesses are evident. First, 
migrants are not distributed as integers and thus rounding is required. Second, the 
propensity to send migrants abroad is based on the sum of the relevant row (the total 
number of migrants abroad from any particular country). If it happens that a specific 
country sends many people to a country for which no data were collected, its propensity 
will be underestimated.  
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Table 5. Propensity shares for "Other Oceania" split for Portugal 
 
Country Propensity  share  Share*No. 
migrants to be 
assigned 
(rounded) 
Australia 0.25863  2 
New Zealand  0.36202  2 
American Samoa  0.02795  0 
Cook Islands  0.01569  0 
Fiji 0.09991  1 
French Polynesia  0.00064  0 
Guam 0.05765  0 
Kiribati 0.00170  0 
Marshall Islands  0.00606  0 
Federated States of Micronesia  0.01331  0 
Nauru 0.00066  0 
New Caledonia  0.00112  0 
Norfolk Island  0.00026  0 
Northern Marianas  0.00518  0 
Niue 0.00458  0 
Palau 0.00390  0 
Papua New Guinea  0.02229  0 
Samoa 0.07457  1 
Solomon Islands  0.00188  0 
Tokelau 0.00170  0 
Tonga 0.03565  0 
Tuvalu 0.00109  0 
Vanuatu 0.00166  0 
Wallis and Fortuna  0.00189  0 




Some countries provide no bilateral information, and so we have only the totals supplied 
by the United Nations. As the main aim of the project was to produce a full bilateral 
matrix, it was important to calculate these coefficients. These were calculated on the 
same basis as the remainder, "Other" categories, i.e. based on the equation in 4b 
above, the propensity for countries to send people abroad, with the only difference being 
that rather than restricting the number of countries used to calculate the shares to those 
countries comprising the remainder category, the shares were calculated for all 226 
countries, i.e. global as opposed to regional shares. The 30 countries until now lacking 
bilateral data therefore had all their coefficients estimated. Lastly, once the foreign-born 
matrix was filled, all of the data prior to 2000 were scaled to the United Nations (2004) 
mid-year-totals for 2000 so that a complete bilateral matrix for the foreign-born for the 
years 2000-2002 resulted (data for 2001 and 2002 were not scaled to the United Nations 
totals). Although a later United Nations dataset could have been utilized to extrapolate 
the data further into the future, it was considered more prudent in terms of accuracy to 
use that year for which most of the data are recorded. This allowed the inclusion of many 
countries that have neither collected the relevant migration statistics nor released them. 
The drawback in these circumstances is that the migration history between the date that 
the older source was conducted and 2000/01 will be lost as the relative shares are 
maintained over time. Table 6 provides details of the data contained in each version, 
together with the number of immigrants included.  
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Information contained  Main countries whose status is 





Raw data collected including older primary 
sources where later information 
unavailable. 
Meaningless "unknown" totals omitted. 
Those countries where totals reported prior 
to break-up redistributed according to 
bilateral migration stocks post break-up.  
Aggregated in dependences. 






Separated jointly reported nations, and 
those prior to break-up where no post 
break-up migration data available, 
according to population shares.  
Disaggregated according to subsequent 
migration stats: 






Removed ethnic nationalities with little or 
no correlation to states or regions. 
Added additional DFID figures on the 
number of Indians residing in Middle 
Eastern Economies. 
Removed ambiguous and "ignored" 
categories as these most likely account for 
domestic population and not migrants. 
Removed those recorded with dual 
nationality. 
Removed meaningless ethnicities: 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
Removed unknown and ignored figures: 
Argentina, Netherlands, Sweden, Thailand, 
Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary 
Added DFID figures: 
Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait 
Removed dual nationality:  
 Liechtenstein  
4a 
Entered United Nations data for country of 
birth totals where data missing. 
Used entropy measure to compare 
nationality and country of birth shares. 
Having confirmed that the series were 
highly correlated, used the additional 
information content in the nationality matrix 
to supplement the foreign-born matrix with 
additional coefficients of interest. 
4b 
Disaggregated remainder categories 
based on countries’ propensity to send 
migrants abroad. 
4c 
FB = Total 
= 175.7m 
Used shares based on countries’ 
propensity to send migrants abroad to fill 
all remaining bilateral coefficients. 
Scaled data to United Nations (2004) 
Countries included where no data previously:  
China, Indonesia, Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea, Morocco, Algeria, Yemen 
Countries that had nationality data used to 
supplement FB Matrix: 






5.  What the Data Show
20 
 
The principal purpose of this paper is to introduce a dataset that we believe will be useful 
for other researchers. We intend to use it for several purposes, such as updating the 
Walmsley and Winters (2005) analysis of the economic benefits of migration, in which 
the lack of bilateral migration data severely hampered the estimation of the distribution of 
those benefits. The aim of this section is not to embark upon such a detailed analysis but 
briefly to illustrate the patterns that the bilateral data display both for their intrinsic 
interest and to allow readers to judge whether the whole enterprise is plausible. Most of 
the value of the bilateral data lies in their country detail, but that is far too great for us to 
                                                 
20 This summary refers to the current version of the dataset. Ratha’s (2006) results and data (which focus on 
the South-South dimension) differ a little: his are scaled up to 2005, contain 14 fewer countries but 15 million 
more migrants, have treated "other" and residual categories differently, and have combined foreign-born and 
foreign nationality differently.    16
summarize here. Thus, once we move beyond simple totals, data are presented only for 
the standard World Bank regions of developing countries and geographical aggregations 
of high-income countries. 
 
The final version of the database, version 4c, contains 175.7 million international 
migrants. This figure corresponds closely to the United Nations figure for 2000 of 175 
million, although our data refer to 2000-2002. Table 7 reports the top 15 migrant 
recipient and sending countries in absolute terms according to the dataset. We exclude 
three countries from the FSU, Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which we believe are 
not representative of "normal" migration behavior. As a single country, the USSR had 
considerable internal mobility (some forced); when it split up, many of the people 
involved were recorded as migrants as the result of the changing country definitions 
rather than of any movement that they chose to undertake. These data contain no 
bilateral information but are reported merely to demonstrate that they correspond well to 
the United Nations totals by country.  
 
As is well known, the United States is the largest recipient of migrants and now has 
around 12.5 percent (some 35 million) of its population foreign-born. Australia, Canada 
and Saudi Arabia show higher percentages and Western Europe not much smaller. 
Among developing countries, India and Pakistan have high immigration, as did Côte 
d’Ivoire and Iran in our sample period. Turning to countries of emigration, Mexico, 
Afghanistan and Morocco show major outflows in proportionate terms and India and 
Bangladesh in absolute terms. Rich countries are also important sources, with the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and even the United States within the top 15. Because 
we use an absolute criterion, all the countries in Table 7 are large. Large countries 
generally show proportionately much less migration than small countries, several of 
which have more people abroad than at home or more immigrants than locals among 
the resident population. 
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Table 7. Share of migrant population in total and from/to neighboring country 
 
 
United States  34,634,798  12.5  10,281,887 29.7 Mexico 10,098,858 10.0 9,347,744 92.6
Germany  9,143,244  11.2  957,016 10.5 India 8,958,965 0.9 1,646,792 18.4
France  6,277,188  10.5  1,274,652 20.3 Bangladesh 6,638,008 5.0 3,807,203 57.4
India  6,270,659  0.6  5,822,700 92.9 China 5,793,974 0.5 2,442,169 42.2
Canada  5,717,003  18.3  945,091 16.5 UK 4,193,174 7.1 248,527 5.9
Saudi Arabia  5,254,812  23.0  596,912 11.4 Germany 4,047,061 4.9 915,277 22.6
UK  4,865,541  8.2  537,885 11.1 Philippines 3,405,471 4.3 - -
Pakistan  4,242,691  3.0  724,233 17.1 Pakistan 3,386,516 2.4 1,360,069 40.2
Australia  4,073,213  21.0  - - Italy 3,283,208 5.7 704,628 21.5
Hong Kong  2,703,491  37.7  2,193,425 81.1 Turkey 3,001,152 4.5 184,940 6.2
Cote d'Ivoire  2,336,359  15.4  1,908,976 81.7 Afghanistan 2,695,589 9.9 1,898,925 70.4
Iran  2,321,453  3.6  2,298,835 99.0 Morocco 2,614,663 9.0 346,073 13.2
Spain  2,172,201  5.5  530,358 24.4 USA 2,269,220 0.8 620,712 27.4
Israel  1,978,103  31.1  34,882 1.8 Egypt 2,248,937 3.5 216,555 9.6
Jordan  1,945,210  39.0  218,582 11.2 Algeria 2,085,260 6.7 100,668 4.8
Total  93,935,966  5.0  28,325,434 30.2 Total 64,720,056 1.9 23,840,282 36.8
Top 15 receiving  
countries* 
Number of  
immigrants 














as % of home 
population
 
Note: Neighboring countries include all countries with land borders to the receiving/sending country. According to this definition, island countries do not have any 
neighboring countries. 
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More interesting than the aggregates in Table 7 are the columns on migration between 
neighboring countries. For these major migrant countries, we have used the bilateral 
dataset to calculate the proportion of migrants who come from or go to countries with a 
land border with the target country. The striking feature of these columns is the wide 
variety of experience. For India and Iran, over 90 percent of the flow is from such 
neighboring countries and for Hong Kong and Côte d'Ivoire over 80 percent. Pakistan, 
on the other hand, receives most migrants from Bangladesh and has only 17 percent 
from contiguous countries. At the other extreme, Australia and Israel have hardly any. It 
is not difficult to explain these patterns intuitively. Australia has no land neighbors and 
Israel’s immigration is mainly religious, but it is useful to have them confirmed 
statistically and useful also to recognize the difficulty of making generalizations about 
neighborhood effects on migratory flows.  
 
Turning to the genuinely bilateral data, Table 8 aggregates the data into 12 receiving 
and sending regions, expressing the recorded stocks as percentages of the total 
migratory stock: each 0.01 percent corresponds to about 17,500 people. The first feature 
to note is the strong diagonal: much migration takes place within regions. Nearly 17 
percent of recorded migration occurs with Europe and Central Asia (ECA): we do not 
know precisely how much of this is created by border changes, but we suspect that the 
majority of it is. The second largest item in this aggregation is the stock of Latin 
Americans (including Mexicans) in the USA. The third and fourth largest are those within 
Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) and South Asia (SAS). The latter two show clearly that South-
South migration is quantitatively significant.  
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Table 8. Percentage of world migrants recorded as a bilateral movement between pairs of countries/regions (%) 
 
USA 0 0.16 0.34 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.43 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.02 1.29
Canada 0.54 0 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.74
EU15+EFTA 2.22 0.98 5.59 1.13 0.01 0.14 0.68 0.78 0.16 0.39 0.20 0.19 12.47
Australia+New Zealand 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.55
Japan 0.28 0.02 0.06 0.02 0 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.50
High income MENA 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.72 0.01 0.04 0.03 1.14
LAC 10.22 0.36 1.45 0.05 0.13 0.10 2.07 0.17 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.25 15.15
ECA 1.25 0.39 4.75 0.26 0.00 0.92 0.07 16.98 0.33 0.34 0.18 0.41 25.88
MENA 0.47 0.17 2.85 0.10 0.00 1.49 0.04 0.16 1.79 0.28 0.05 0.12 7.52
AFR 0.41 0.12 1.58 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.11 0.18 7.00 0.03 0.16 9.97
EAP 3.32 0.71 1.09 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.09 3.86 0.27 11.32
SAS 0.83 0.31 1.13 0.12 0.01 2.66 0.02 0.13 2.07 0.14 0.37 5.67 13.46












LAC ECA Total MENA AFR EAP SAS
 
Note: “EU15 + EFTA” includes Switzerland. 
 
EU European Union 
EFTA European Free Trade Area 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa 
LAC  Latin America and the Caribbean 
ECA  Europe and Central Asia 
AFR  Sub-Saharan Africa 
EAP  East Asia and the Pacific 
SAS  South Asia 
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Figure 1 summarizes these data graphically, distinguishing North (rich), South (poor) 
and the FSU countries. The bulk of FSU migration is intra-regional; it is probably largely 
spurious. For Northern emigrants, the principal destination is other Northern countries. 
This reflects mainly the propensity of Europeans to migrate not only within Europe (5.6 
percent of the world total), but also to North America and Oceania. Southern emigrants, 
on the other hand, go more to Northern destinations than to Southern ones and 
outnumber Northern migrants in those countries. But as recipients, Southern countries 
get most of their immigrants from other poor countries. Overall, South-to-North 
emigration accounts for 37 percent of total emigration, South-South for 24 percent and 























Embedded in table 8 is evidence of the large differences between hosts in the sources of 
their immigrants and differences between sources in their hosts. Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate these differences more obviously.  
 
For each developed country (Northern) group, figure 2 gives the breakdown of its 
immigration by origin. Thus we see Europeans accounting for significant shares of 
immigration in Europe, Canada and Australia, but nowhere else. For the USA, the 
dominant origin is Latin America, accounting for 52 percent of the total, and that region is 
also important in Japan’s (admittedly small) total. The latter reflects the special treatment 
offered to Latin Americans of Japanese origin. Even more striking is the share of 
immigrants from East Asia and the Pacific in Japan’s total immigrant stock, although in 
absolute numbers Australia and New Zealand are more important destinations for that 
region. Among high-income regions, only the Gulf (high income MENA) has a high share 















Figure 1:   Bilateral Migration Stocks (% of world total)  21






































USA Canada EU15+EFTA Australia+New Zealand
Japan High income MENA LAC ECA
MENA AFR EAP SAS
 
 
Figure 3 offers the obverse view – the choice of destinations for each source region. For 
Northern regions, the principal destinations are Northern: fully 80 percent for Europe. On 
the other hand, because Europe’s outflow is so much larger than the other Northern 
regions, its absolute supply of people to each of the developing regions is larger (Table 
8). For developing source countries, the principal destinations are intra-regional, 
especially for ECA and Africa. But beyond that, we see different degrees of reliance on 
the Gulf (high for SAS and MENA and low for ECA and AFR), Europe (high for ECA and 
relatively low for EAP and SAS) and North American (low except for LAC and EAP). It is 
not difficult to see the role of geography in the creation of these corridors, but equally 
well one can see that geography is not all.   22










































USA + Canada EU15+
EFTA
Other high income LAC ECA MENA AFR EAP SAS
 
 
Interesting though table 8 and the figures are, they do not readily show whether 
migration patterns are biased in the sense that migrants from one source are more likely 
to go to one place than another. This is because it is not clear whether the importance 
of, say, North America as a destination for EAP arises because it is a major recipient of 
migrants from every region or because EAP residents have a particular propensity or 
ability to migrate there. To answer this question we calculate a series of migration 




where, Xi,j is the stock of migrants from i in region j and a dot (.) denotes summation 
across the corresponding subscript. This expresses the share of i in j’s stock of 
immigrants relative to i’s share of world total immigrants. Thus an intensity index 
exceeding one implies that i is a more important source for j's immigrants than it is for 
world immigrants on average. (The intensity index also equals j’s share of i’s stock of 
emigrants relative to j’s share of world emigrants. Hence, a value above 1 indicates that j 
is a more important destination for i’s emigrants than for source countries on average.) If 
bilateral flows were random, so that all emigrants from all countries had an equal chance 
of ending up in, say, Europe, and an equal (albeit different) chance of ending up in, say, 
Africa, the intensity indices would be unity. If they exceed unity for a bilateral link, they 
indicate that there is a bias towards that link. The indices are reported in table 9.   23
Table 9. Migration Intensity Measures             
                 
                 
Destination Countries/Regions 
Countries/Regions of Origin 









LAC ECA  MENA  AFR EAP SAS 
USA 0  3.77  1.36  1.09  2.32 0.37 9.56 0.16 0.70 0.23 2.21 0.23 
Canada  3.69  0  0.73  0.99  0.74 0.12 0.73 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.31 0.25 
EU15+EFTA  0.90 2.41  2.34  3.34  0.15 0.18 1.58 0.34 0.23 0.37 0.31 0.22 
Australia+New Zealand  0.54 0.96  1.50  15.76  1.21 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.17 1.17 0.30 
Japan  2.87 0.95  0.65  1.42  0  0.07 2.48 0.08 0.16 0.10 1.98 0.24 
High income MENA  0.47  0.72  0.28 0.28 0.03  1.63  0.13 0.08  11.45  0.09 0.65 0.42 
LAC  3.42  0.73  0.50 0.11 1.19  0.11  3.96  0.06 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.23 
ECA  0.25  0.46  0.96 0.36 0.02  0.57  0.08  3.54  0.23 0.16 0.13 0.22 
MENA  0.32  0.68  1.98  0.49  0.06 3.20 0.15 0.11 4.31  0.44 0.13 0.21 
AFR  0.21  0.38  0.83  0.38  0.03 0.41 0.05 0.06 0.33 8.31  0.06 0.22 
EAP  1.49  1.94  0.50  2.06  6.43 0.68 0.16 0.07 0.22 0.09 6.68  0.33 
SAS  0.31  0.71  0.44  0.33  0.13 3.18 0.04 0.05 2.78 0.13 0.54 5.89 
N o t e :   " E U 1 5   +   E F T A "   i n c l u d e s   S w i t z e r l a n d .                  
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Table 9 demonstrates the strong bias towards intra-regional migration. Every diagonal 
element exceeds unity (except where it is zero because there is only one country in the 
region), very much so in some cases. Australia and New Zealand have a huge 
propensity to migrate between themselves, perhaps reflecting the integrated labor 
market created under the Closer Economic Relations Agreement, or maybe just their 
isolation. In second place is intra-African migration, more probably a reflection of 
Africans’ relative unwelcomeness elsewhere, than of anything positive.  Among the off-
diagonal elements of note are the strength of the EAP-Japan link; the close links 
between the USA and Canada; the bias towards the USA for LAC emigrants, which we 
have noted before, and the bias of US emigrants towards LAC, which we have not; the 
European tendency to choose other Northern destinations; and the strong relative 
movement from high-income MENA (the Gulf) to developing MENA.  Again, these 
patterns are not all surprising, but it is useful to have them explicit and their 
quantification will, we hope, allow a good deal of subsequent research to explain them. 
 
The bilateral data allow us to explore a number of possible factors behind migration, 
descriptively here, but possibly econometrically in future. One concerns the influence of 
a common language. For 163 of our countries we have been able to identify a 

























Figure 4 shows that over half of international migration (that on the right hand side of the 
pie) takes place between countries with a common language, the lion’s share of this 
being between English-speaking countries. Dividing each language group into North and 
South shows that much of the common language flow is within the North or within the 
South, but that the North-South dimension is also strong. Every Northern language 
group draws a large share of its immigrants from regions in the South which share its 
language and, where this is not the largest share, it is dominated by another well-
trodden South-North path. The Arabic-North has a higher percentage from the English-








speaking South (SAS-to-higher income MENA migration); the English North has its 
greatest share from the Spanish-speaking South (Mexico to US migration); and the 
French North takes a majority of its immigrants from the Arabic-speaking South (North 
Africa to France migration).  
 
Table 10, which presents the data as intensity indicators, also shows how important a 
common language is. The intensities are generally highest within the language families, 
but often higher for the North-South or South-North links than the others (see the shaded 
(2x2) matrices down the main diagonal). This is not saying that more migrants travel 
between income classes than within them, but that given the overall totals of migrants 
the bias towards "between" is stronger. There are also some strong cross-language 
intensities, mainly reflecting location. Thus, the French, Spanish and Portuguese North 
is strongly integrated, the Arabic South feeds the French North, and the Portuguese 
South feeds the Chinese South.   26
Table 10. Migration and language: migration intensity measures 
 
Arabic North 1.19 8.95 0.17 0.52 0.36 0.29 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.08
Arabic South 2.83 3.47 0.09 0.29 0.27 0.29 4.21 0.58 0.03 0.29 1.67 0.08
Chinese North 0.05 0.07 2.12 6.30 2.09 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.38 0.36 0.00 0.20
Chinese South 0.06 0.08 16.42 0 0.87 0.73 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.31 0.17
English North 0.15 0.21 0.10 1.15 1.91 0.40 0.38 0.12 0.42 0.23 0.74 1.18
English South 1.89 0.84 0.28 1.37 0.75 2.05 0.11 0.55 0.12 1.09 0.13 0.05
French North 0.26 0.35 0.04 0.46 0.74 0.29 4.03 2.22 9.74 0.78 5.98 0.50
French South 0.05 0.96 0.01 0.05 0.20 1.41 1.15 7.04 0.09 0.41 0.16 0.31
Portuguese North 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.17 0.66 0.21 7.61 0.13 0 17.23 2.19 0.95
Portuguese South 0.04 0.08 0.03 7.85 0.30 2.72 0.43 0.92 23.83 2.01 0.83 1.52
Spanish North 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.24 0.51 0.28 6.45 0.12 2.12 3.80 1.81 6.03





























Note: Calculations based on the sub-sample of 163 countries.  
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A second factor frequently spoken of is distance. This is clearly related to the question of 
migration to and from neighbors discussed above, but even for non-contiguous 
countries, distance is often felt to matter. Calculating distances as great circle distances 
between the geographical centres of our 226 countries, as given in the CIA World Fact 
Book, the main body of Table 11 reports the average distance travelled within each cell 
of the regional bilateral matrix. The distances for the various bilateral country-to-country 
links are weighted together by the amount of migration for that link. Of course, the 
distances are exogenous features of geography, so, for example, the distance from 
South Asia to North America is inevitably about 12,000 kilometers. Hence, there is not 
much to be read from the numbers per se. It is true that North-North migrants (in the top 
left of the matrix) generally have to travel smaller distances than South-South migrants 
(lower right) or North-South or South-North ones, but with Oceania among the Northern 
set, the difference is not huge. The mean distance for all migrants in the world is 4,225 
kilometers. 
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Table 11. Average distance between origin and destination countries (km) 
 
USA + Canada 2,451 7,170 12,624 3,064 8,805 10,566 11,211 12,570 11,604
EU15+EFTA 7,151 937 14,136 9,044 2,417 3,232 6,839 11,340 6,164
Other high income 10,859 11,938 3,627 15,886 7,411 901 9,055 5,226 5,175
LAC 2,815 8,571 14,734 1,386 11,546 11,738 10,560 15,863 14,319
ECA 8,429 1,880 5,674 11,405 3,012 3,177 7,886 9,352 3,754
MENA 10,387 2,253 2,334 10,807 2,932 1,246 3,659 10,924 5,026
AFR 11,718 6,124 4,815 9,017 6,901 3,137 1,272 11,207 7,013
EAP 11,935 10,024 5,167 16,143 6,735 8,668 11,061 4,344 4,212










-0.59 -0.72 -0.54 -0.48
LAC ECA MENA
Correlation with numbers by 
destination
-0.51 -0.88 -0.47 -0.75 -0.38
AFR EAP SAS
Countries/Regions of Origin
Destination Countries/Regions Correlation with 









Note: "EU15 + EFTA" includes Switzerland. "Other high income" includes Australia, New Zealand, Japan and high income MENA countries. Figures are weighted by the 
number of migrants. Calculations are based on the geographic coordinates of each country, which are rounded latitude and longitude figures of the approximate geographic 
centre of a country (source: CIA, The World Fact Book).   29
Migration numbers, on the other hand, are not exogenous and we can test whether they 
reflect distance at all. First, consider figures 5A and 5B. They report for the developing 
country regions the average distance migrants have travelled to North America and 
Western Europe and the number who have migrated in thousands. It is clear that there is 
a negative relationship between these, especially for Europe. In addition, the last row 
and column of Table 11 report the correlations (at regional level) between the migration 
stock reported in table 7 and the distance reported here. They are all negative and half 
are significantly different from zero (critical value at 5 percent is 0.582). This suggests 






































A third influence on migration is income. We expect most migrants to have higher 
incomes as a result of migration, although in particular instances non-pecuniary benefits 
may dominate. Income is, of course, an individual or household matter, dependent on 
the individual’s circumstances before and after migration. We cannot gauge that with 
country-level data, but it is still interesting to ask whether migration is predominantly from 
 
Figure 5A  Migrants in North America and Distance 











Figure 5B.  Migrants in Western Europe and 
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low to high-income countries. Table 12 provides a view of this. For each of our region-to-
region links it calculates the percentage change in average gross national income (GNI) 
per capita for the average migrant. That is, for each bilateral link it calculates the change 
in current dollar GNI per capita and then weights these together into regional summaries 
by the number of migrants reported for the link.
21 The GNI is generated in $US using the 
World Bank Atlas method of conversion and divided by the mid-year population and is 
taken from the World Development indicators for 2001. The matrix is best thought of in 
terms of blocks. With the Northern groups reported first, the (3x3) matrix in the top left 
corner refers to North-North movements. The differentials are small here, but they show 
the North Americans always "losing", for example. The (3x6) matrix in the top right is 
North to South and it shows massive "income loses" for Northern people migrating to 
developing countries. The (6x3) matrix in the bottom left is South-North and shows huge 
gains. The final sub-matrix – (6x6) in the lower right - is South-South. It has pluses and 
minuses as one would expect, given the spread of incomes from essentially middle-
income regions LAC and EAP to the very poor in AFR and SAS. 
                                                 
21 The GNI refer to 2001, not the (unknown) years in which migrants moved, but the basic argument still 
holds.   31
Table 12. Average difference in GNI per capita between origin and destination countries 
(current US$) 
 
USA + Canada 6,918 -8,026 -10,907 -27,428 -29,265 -32,099 -31,287 -30,939 -29,570
EU15+EFTA 8,694 3,334 -4,332 -12,129 -20,061 -20,297 -20,041 -21,571 -21,367
Other high income 5,419 2,743 1,152 -29,321 -17,856 -14,407 -19,881 -18,316 -19,147
LAC 29,523 17,560 22,511 2,290 -2,944 -2,626 -3,890 510 -3,933
ECA 29,018 20,755 15,123 2,586 269 487 -839 10,862 -1,268
MENA 29,244 21,298 9,853 1,577 -107 168 -1,220 9,209 -1,207
AFR 31,290 21,395 12,700 4,667 819 1,825 199 2,226 -50
EAP 27,820 19,959 16,827 -977 -1,432 465 -2,843 11,320 -3,191
SAS 30,879 24,034 13,046 5,681 989 4,036 -39 9,204 62











Note: "EU15 + EFTA" includes Switzerland. "Other high income" includes Australia, New Zealand, Japan and high income MENA countries. Figures are weighted 
by the number of migrants. Note also that the calculations are based on 180 countries excluding those for which we were not able to obtain data on GNI per capita 
for 2001  
Source: World Development Indicators. 
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Two statistics, however, show the general tendency for migrants to move up the GNI per 
capita ladder. First, every element on the diagonal, i.e. every intra-regional migrant link, 
shows gains. On the diagonal, the sets of receiving countries and the sets of sending 
countries are identical, so the unweighted difference in GNI per capita between them is 
zero. Thus, the positive signs reported must reflect the fact that more people move along 
the paths with increasing GNI per capita than along those with falling GNI per capita. 
The second statistic is to collapse the whole world into a single entity and calculate the 
differential. Again, the sets of recipients and senders are identical so the average gain of 
$9,479 must again reflect a bias in the movement toward those that increase GNI per 
capita. The increase is large and while GNI per capita will clearly not reflect only returns 
to labor and while migrants will typically have above-average earning power in their 
home countries and, these days, probably below-average earning power in their new 
countries, it suggests large returns to migration.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In spite of the inherent inaccuracy due to a lack of bilateral data for some countries, the 
assumptions made and the rough-and-ready methodologies used, the database 
developed here should provide a reasonably realistic view of current migration patterns. 
Considering the heterogeneity that exists between the available sources and the various 
missing components, any undertaking on this subject will inevitably be rather crude. We 
see no way of improving upon it, however, given current data availability and so we 
present our series “as is”. We would be delighted to hear of potential extensions or 
improvements, or, indeed, to see them made by other researchers. To that end, we have 
tried to highlight the problems encountered and to provide alternative series so that other 
researchers can build upon our data as they see fit. Despite their shortcomings, we 
believe that the data will prove valuable in a wide range of applications throughout the 
social sciences, enhancing both our understanding of global migration and the policy 
debate surrounding it.  
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Annex 1 
 
Summary of Data Sources 
 
 
Country  Data type  Nationality or 
Birth 
Source Year 
Australia B  B  C  2001 
New Zealand  B  B  C  2001 
American Samoa  B  B  C  2000 
Cook Islands  B  N  C  2001 
Fiji B  B  C  1986 
French Polynesia  B/B  B/N  C/C  2002/2002 
Guam B  B  C  2000 
Kiribati B  E  C  2000 
Marshall Islands  B  N  C  1999 
Micronesia, 
Federated States of 
B B C  2000 
Nauru UN  N  U  2000 
New Caledonia  B  N  C  1996 
Norfolk Island  B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
B B C  2000 
Niue B  N  C  2001 
Palau B  B  C  2000 
Papua New Guinea  B  B  C  1971 
Samoa B  B  C  2001 
Solomon Islands  B/B  N/B  C  1999 
Tokelau B  E  C  1996 
Tonga B  E  C  1996 
Tuvalu T  N  C  2002 
Vanuatu B  N  C  1999 
Wallis and Futuna  B  B  C  1996 
China UN  E  U  2000 
Hong Kong  B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Japan B  N  C  2000 
Korea, Republic of  B  N  C  2000 
Taiwan B  N  S  2000 
Macau B/B  B/O  C/S  1991/2001 
Mongolia B  N  C  2000 
Korea, Democratic 
People’s Republic of 
UN E  U 2000 
Indonesia UN  N  U  2000 
Malaysia B  B  C  1991 
Philippines B  N  C  2000 
Singapore B  B  C  2000 
Thailand B  N  S  2000 
Viet Nam  T  N  C  1999 
Brunei Darussalam  B  B  C  1991 
Cambodia B  N  C  1998 
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 
B N C  1995 
Myanmar B  N  S  2000 
Timor Leste  UN  E  U  2000 
Bangladesh B  B  C  1974 
India B  B  C  2001 
Sri Lanka  B  N  C  1981 
Afghanistan UN  E  U  2000 
Bhutan UN  N  U  2000   34
Country  Data type  Nationality or 
Birth 
Source Year 
Maldives UN  N  U  2000 
Nepal B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Pakistan T  B  C  1998 
Canada B  B  C  2001 
United States of 
America 
B B C  2000 
Mexico B  B  C  2000 
Bermuda B  B  C  2000 
Greenland UN  B  U  2000 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 
B B C  1974 
Colombia B  B  C  1993 
Peru B  B  C  1993 
Venezuela B  B  C  2001 
Bolivia B  B  C  2002 
Ecuador B  B  C  2001 
Argentina B  B  C  2001 
Brazil B/B  B/B  C/C 1991/2000 
Chile B  B  C  2002 
Uruguay B  B  C  1996 
Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) 
B/B B/N C/C  2001/2001 
French Guiana  B  N  C  1990 
Guyana B  B  C  2002 
Paraguay B  B  C  2002 
Suriname UN  N  U  2000 
Belize B  B  C  2000 
Costa Rica  B/B  B/N  C/C  2002/2002 
El Salvador  B  B  C  1990 
Guatemala B  B  C  2002 
Honduras B  B  C  2001 
Nicaragua B  B  C  1995 
Panama B  B  C  2000 
Antigua & Barbuda  B  B  C  2001 
Bahamas B  N  C  2001 
Barbados B  B  C  1990 
Dominica B  B  C  1981 
Dominican Republic  B  B  C  2002 
Grenada UN  B  U  2000 
Haiti B  B  C  1971 
Jamaica B  B  C  1960 
Puerto Rico  T  B  C  2000 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  UN  B  U  2000 
Saint Lucia  B  B  C  2001 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
B B C  1991 
Trinidad and Tobago  B  B  C  2000 
Virgin Islands, U.S.  B  B  C  2000 
Anguilla B  N  C  2001 
Aruba B  N  C  2000 
Cayman Islands  B  B  C  1989 
Cuba B  B  C  1970 
Guadeloupe B  N  C  1990 
Martinique B  N  C  1990 
Montserrat T  B  C  2001 
Netherlands Antilles  B/B B/N C/C  2001/2001 
Turks and Caicos  B\B  B/N  C/C  1990/2001   35
Country  Data type  Nationality or 
Birth 
Source Year 
Virgin Islands, British   B  B  C  1991 
Austria B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Belgium B/B  B/N O/S  2001/2000 
Denmark B/B  B/N  P/S  2001/2001 
Finland B/B  B/N  P/P  2001/2002 
France B/B  B/N  C/C  1999/1999 
Germany B/B  B/N  C/S  2001/2001 
United Kingdom  B  B  C  2001 
Greece B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Ireland B/B  B/N  C/C  2002/2002 
Italy B  N  S  2000 
Luxembourg B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Netherlands B/B  B/N  P/P  2001/2001 
Portugal B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Spain B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Sweden B/B  B/N  P/P  2001/2001 
Switzerland B/B  B/N  C/P  2000/2000 
Iceland B/B  B/N  P/P  2001/2001 
Liechtenstein B  B  S  2000 
Norway B/B  B/N  P/P  2001/2001 
Andorra B  N  S  2002 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
B E C  1991 
Faeroe Islands  UN  B  U  2000 




B N C  1994 
Monaco B  N  C  2000 
San Marino  UN  B  U  2000 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
UN B  U 2000 
Albania T/B  B/N  C/C  2001/1989 
Bulgaria B  N  C  2001 
Croatia B/B  B/E  C/S  2001/2001 
Cyprus B  B  C  2002 
Czech Republic  B/B  B/N  C/R  2001/2000 
Hungary B/B  B/N  C/S  2001/2001 
Malta B/B  B/N  C/C  1995/1995 
Poland B  B  C  2001 
Romania B/B  B/E  C/C  2002/2002 
Slovakia B/B  B/E  C/S  2001/2001 
Slovenia B  N  C  2001 
Estonia B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Latvia B  N  S  2001 
Lithuania B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Russian Federation  B/B  B/N  C/C  2002/2002 
Armenia B/T  B/N  C/S  2001/2001 
Azerbaijan B  N  S  2001 
Belarus B  E  S  1999 
Georgia B  B  C  2002 
Kazakhstan B  E  S  1999 
Kyrgyzstan B  E  S  1999 
Moldova, Republic of  B  E  S  2001 
Tajikistan B  E  S  1989 
Turkmenistan B E  C  1995 
Ukraine B/B  B/E  C/C  2001/2001   36
Country  Data type  Nationality or 
Birth 
Source Year 
Uzbekistan B  E  S  1989 
Turkey B/B  B/N  C/S  2001/1998 
Bahrain B  N  C  2001 
Iran, Islamic Republic 
of 
B N C  1996 
Iraq UN  N  U  2000 
Israel B  B  S  2001 
Jordan T  N  C  1994 
Kuwait T  N  S  2001 
Lebanon UN  B  U  2000 
Palestinian Territory, 
Occupied  
B/B B/N C/C  1997/1997 
Oman B  N  C  1993 
Qatar UN  N  U  2000 
Saudi Arabia  B  N  S  1995 
Syrian Arab Republic  B  N  C  1981 
United Arab Emirates  T  N  S  1993 
Yemen UN  N  U  2000 
Morocco UN  N  C  2000 
Tunisia B  N  C  1994 
Algeria UN  N  U  2000 
Egypt B  N  C  1996 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
B/B O/N C/C  1964/1973 
Botswana B  N  C  2001 
South Africa  B/B  B/N  C/C  2001/2001 
Lesotho B  N  C  1996 
Namibia B  N  C  1991 
Swaziland B  N  C  1997 
Malawi B  N  C  1998 
Mozambique B  N  C  1997 
Tanzania, United 
Republic of 
B B C  2002 
Zambia B  N  C  2000 
Zimbabwe UN  B  U  2000 




B N C  1984 
Mauritius B  N  C  2000 
Seychelles B  N  C  1997 
Madagascar B  B  C  1996 
Uganda B  N  C  2002 
Benin B  N  C  1992 
Burkina Faso  B  N  S  1996 
Burundi UN  B  U  2000 
Cameroon B  B  C  1976 
Cape Verde  B  B  C  1990 
Central African 
Republic 
B N C  1988 
Chad B  N  C  1993 
Comoros B  N  C  1980 
Congo B  N  C  1984 
Cote d'Ivoire  B  N  C  1992 
Djibouti UN  E  U  2000 
Equatorial Guinea  B  N  C  1994 
Eritrea UN  E  U  2000 
Ethiopia B  N  C  1994   37
Country  Data type  Nationality or 
Birth 
Source Year 
Gabon B  N  C  1993 
Gambia B  N  C  1983 
Ghana B  N  C  2000 
Guinea UN  N  U  2000 
Guinea-Bissau B  N  C 1991 
Kenya T  N  C  1999 
Liberia B  B  C  1974 
Mali UN  N  U  2000 
Mauritania B  N  C  1988 
Mayotte --  -  -  - 
Niger B  B  C  1988 
Nigeria B  N  C  1991 
Reunion B  N  C  1999 
Rwanda B  N  C  2002 
Saint Helena  UN  B  U  2000 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
B/B B/N C/C  1991/1991 
Senegal B/B  B/N  C/C  1976/1976 
Sierra Leone  B  N  C  1985 
Somalia UN  E  U  2000 
Sudan B/N  B/B  C/C  1953/1993 
Togo  B N C  1981 
Where two letters are recorded and separated by a forward slash, the first letter refers to 
data collected by country of birth and the second to information regarding nationality. 
 
T = Total or very limited bilateral entries only 
B = Bilateral (may not be for all 226 countries but at least bilateral for main partners). 
B/B = Bilateral/Bilateral 
B/T = Bilateral/Total 
UN = United Nations total only 
 
N = Nationality 
B = Birth  
E = Ethnicity 
B/N = Birth and nationality 
O = Other but equivalent  
 
C= Census  
PR = Population register 
S = Source unclear or not stated but obtained from National Statistics Bureau, either directly or 
from published yearly handbooks.  
U = Unknown, need check with United Nations 
R = Register of foreigners 
O = Other i.e. survey/permit data 
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Annex 2 
 
The entropy measure used to compare the shares of the foreign born and nationality matrices are 
based on the entropy measure (3) that devised by Walmsley and McDougall (2004): 
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, = the adjusted share of migrants from country r in country s to use in nationality matrix. 
 
  The adjustment to the shares being: 
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Where:   S
A
s r, = The proportion of migrants from country r to the total in country s in the foreign born matrix. 
S
B
s r, = The proportion of migrants from country r to the total in country s in the nationality matrix. 
TINY = Small number 
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